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The Effect of Staggered Boards on Firm Value for Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Ye Di 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of staggered boards on firm value for real 
estate investment trusts (REITs). We argue that REITs are highly regulated firms in an environment 
where the takeover market is inactive. We investigate whether takeover devices function well and 
whether corporate governance hypotheses hold for REITs. We hypothesize that the inefficient 
management hypothesis does not hold for REITs and that staggered boards have no negative impact 
on firm value. We collect data for all REITs listed on Compustat and merge them with information 
from CRSP, BoardEx and company fillings from the SEC’s EDGAR database over the period 1990 
to 2016. We conduct an event study to test whether takeovers discipline inefficient managers in the 
real estate sector and estimate a logistic regression to examine whether staggered boards resist 
takeovers after controlling for prior firm performance, firm financials and board related variables. 
In addition, we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to explore whether staggered 
boards enhance internal monitoring effectiveness and positively affect firm value. The results 
indicate that the market for corporate control in the real estate sector fails to discipline inefficient 
managers, however lower prior firm performance increases a firm’s probability of becoming a 
takeover target. The results also reveal that staggered boards have a negative effect on 
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This paper is concerned with the effect of staggered boards on firm performance in real-estate 
investment trusts (REITs). An agency problem exists between shareholders and management. 
Corporate governance forces managers to align themselves with shareholders, maximizing 
shareholders’ interests. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) demonstrate that there is a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. However, mangers may take part in 
acquisitions that go against shareholders’ interests. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that merger 
negotiations are investments that expand agency conflicts.  
A staggered board is a corporate governance structure and a widely used anti-takeover 
measure. Under a staggered board structure, directors are typically assembled into three classes 
with successive annual re-elections occurring for only one class. Therefore, the number of years 
needed to re-elect all board directors is the same as the number of classes. The fact that it is hard 
to remove the majority of directors in a short period makes it one of the most effective measures 
to deter hostile suitors. A staggered board is a common feature of an REIT’s corporate governance. 
Campbell et al. (2011) show that as many as 61% of REITs have a staggered board. Bebchuk, 
Coates, and Subramanian (2001) contend that firms with a staggered board present a formidable 
obstacle to a change-in-control bid when that bid is contested by target management. This is partly 
due to the increased cost of such a bid in the case of firms with a staggered board (Bebchuk and 
Cohen, 2005). 
Several studies argue that staggered boards have a negative effect on shareholders’ wealth 
based on the entrenched management hypothesis (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Cremers and Nair, 
2005; Faleye, 2007). This hypothesis holds the view that entrenched managers adopt takeover 
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strategies to insulate themselves from market discipline, thereby engaging in empire building and 
obtaining private benefits (Jensen, 1993).  However, Rose (2009) argues that a staggered board is 
less likely to negatively affect firms that face lower takeover probability. She provides empirical 
evidence that the negative effect of staggered boards disappears for a subset of firms that do not 
operate in a hostile takeover market.  
In the light of this recent evidence, we investigate the relationship between staggered boards 
and firm performance for REITs. We argue that the negative effect observed in general may not 
hold for REITs given that they operate in an environment where the takeover market is non-
existent. REITs are highly regulated firms due to the following three aspects: (1) Ownership 
restrictions (5/50 rule): The five biggest owners of an REIT’s common stock together may not own 
more than 50% of the total shares outstanding. (2) Income and Asset Restrictions: At least 75% of 
income must be derived from real estate-related sources and at least 75% of an REIT’s assets must 
be held in the form of cash, government securities, and real estate-related assets. (3) Mandatory 
Payout Policy: REITs must pay out 95% of net “taxable” earnings. Given these special regulations, 
previous authors have suggested that external mechanisms of control are less important in the case 
of REITs. Allen and Sirmans (1987) were the first to argue that REITs are characterized by a lack 
of hostile takeovers, with only one reported hostile takeover from Moody’s Bank and Finance 
Manual over the 1977-1983 period. Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) suggest that income and asset 
restrictions in REITs result in a lack of hostile takeovers and an absence of inter-industry mergers. 
Furthermore, the dispersed ownership structure makes it hard for large blockholders to gather 
stakes and pose a serious takeover threat. Campbell et al. (2011) argue that the market for corporate 
control is virtually nonexistent in the REIT sector; thus external corporate control is diminished 
and is replaced by internal governance. However, recent studies report contradictory findings. 
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Eichholtz and Kok (2008) find that the takeover market in REITs is active because there is a 
positive relationship between the likelihood of being targeted and pre-acquisition 
underperformance, which is in line with the inefficient management hypothesis. Mulherin and 
Womack (2015) examine the level of competition in the REIT mergers-and-acquisitions takeover 
market using a sample of 165 merges occurring during two merger waves. They find that REIT 
takeovers are as competitive as those in other industries. They also make an important contribution 
by defining hostile takeovers in a specific way for the REIT industry – namely, as unsolicited deals 
– and thus conclude that the market for corporate control is more active than previously thought. 
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, we examine whether takeovers discipline the 
senior managers of inefficiently performing REIT firms as they do in other sectors. To achieve our 
objective, we test whether targets underperform their counterparts in the period before takeovers. 
Following Martin and McConnell (1991) and Kennedy and Limmack (1996), we specifically 
explore whether targets classified as undergoing a “disciplinary” takeover obtain lower returns than 
targets in a non-disciplinary (control) group. These groups are defined based on CEO changes; that 
is, if a CEO is not retained for the 2 years after the bid announcement, the takeover is labeled as 
“disciplinary”.  In addition, if the pre- and post-bid CEO change is the result of a disciplinary bid, 
we would expect that disciplinary bids reduce the inefficient allocation of resources and improve 
both the performance and the managerial efficiency of target firms. Then, we also investigate 
whether targets subject to disciplinary takeovers will achieve higher abnormal returns than those 
in the non-disciplinary group around the bid period.  
Second, we argue that under the assumption of a non-existent takeover market in REITs, 
staggered boards are less likely to be adopted to resist hostile takeovers as entrenched managers 
are already immune to market discipline. Because it is difficult to remove the whole board at the 
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same time, we argue that the effect of staggered boards on monitoring managers for long-term 
investments dominates in REITs. Therefore, the presence of a staggered board should lower the 
probability that a firm becomes a target for takeover and we predict a negative relationship between 
staggered boards and takeover probability. 
Finally, the principal objective of this study is to examine whether the observed negative 
effect of staggered boards on firm value holds for REITs. Since this negative relationship is the 
consequence of an intensive market for corporate control, it may not apply to an industry in which 
the hostile market is absent. The notion here is straightforward: the more intensive the takeover 
market, the greater the extent to which entrenched managers are exposed to takeover threats. 
Staggered boards resist market discipline for managers and thus decrease shareholder wealth. 
Specifically, because REITs operate in a market that is free of hostile takeovers, the negative effect 
of staggered boards disappears as entrenched managers are free from market discipline and less 
likely to adopt staggered boards to insulate themselves from hostile acquisitions. From the 
perspective of the characteristics of staggered boards as we previously discussed, staggered boards 
allow directors to serve for multi-year terms (Ahn and Shrestha, 2013). Previous literature 
emphasizes the negative effect of this feature as directors are elected only every three years and 
undervalue the potential positive effect of staggered boards. Koppes et al. (1999) argue that the 
presence of a staggered board can be regarded as a vehicle for allowing boards to focus on long-
term investment plan. However, less attention has been paid to the potential positive effect of 
staggered boards on firm value in other sectors as this effect is masked by the negative effect of 
the anti-takeover stance. Thus, if there is a positive relationship between the presence of staggered 
boards and firm value, we argue that the negative effect of the staggered boards on firm value can 
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be offset or even replaced by the potential positive effect for firms that operate in a non-existent 
hostile market and face lower takeover probability.  
To achieve our objectives, we collect all available REIT firms from Compustat and merge 
with CRSP, and BoardEx. We manually check whether a firm has adopted a staggered board using 
company filings provided by EDGAR. We obtain 315 unique firms and 3755 firm-year 
observations over the period 1990-2016. We conduct an event study before and around the bid 
announcement to assess whether the market for corporate control disciplines inefficiently 
managing firms. To assess the effect of staggered boards on takeover probability and firm value, 
we carry out logistic regression and OLS regression models with year and firm fixed effects. In 
these models, we include firm accounting control variables and selected variables related to a firm’s 
internal corporate governance.  
The main findings are as follows. First, we do not obtain significant differences between the 
disciplinary group and the non-disciplinary group with regard to targets’ abnormal returns. Second, 
there is a negative relationship between the presence of staggered boards and takeover probability.  
We also find that there is a negative association between prior firm performance and takeover 
probability. This implies that the market for corporate control disciplines poorly-managed firms, 
therefore supporting the inefficient management hypothesis. Lastly, staggered boards are 
negatively associated with firm performance, although the negative effect disappears when 
independent directors dominate.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we review the related literature 
and develop our hypotheses. In section 4, we describe our sample selection procedure and define 
the independent variables, dependent variables and control variables. In section 5, we conduct an 
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event study, logistic regression and OLS regression. In section 6, we present the results. Section 7 
concludes.  
Literature Review 
A series of recent studies have explored the conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
management. Managers may implement value-destroying projects in order to gain personal value 
and wealth. Several studies have explored the association between the quality of corporate 
governance and firm performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Cremers and 
Nair, 2005). Gompers et al. (2003) found that firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher 
firm value. They created a Governance Index (referred to as GIM) using Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) data based on 24 corporate governance factors to proxy for shareholder 
rights. Managers tend to make decisions that are not value-maximizing for shareholders when they 
are protected by anti-takeover provisions (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). This is in line with the finding 
that an active hostile takeover market makes it less likely for managers to undertake negative NPV 
projects at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Bebchuk, 2002). However, it is 
important to appreciate that the GIM index reveals the aggregate effects of ATPs and does not 
provide information on the effect of any given anti-takeover device on firm value (Bebchuk and 
Cohen, 2005; Sokolyk, 2011).  
As described in the introduction, a staggered board is a corporate governance structure that 
is widely used as an effective anti-takeover measure. Evidence of the powerful effect of staggered 
boards with regard to deterring takeovers, along with evidence of a lower probability of acquisition 
once a bid has been made, has been well documented (Daines and Klausner, 2001; Bebchuk et al., 
2002; Bates et al., 2008; Sokolyk, 2011). In other words, in the event of poor managerial 
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performance, targets with a staggered board are less likely to receive a takeover bid than other 
targets. Furthermore, studies show that staggered boards are associated with lower firm value, for 
example, as measured by Tobin’s q (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). Jensen (1993) holds the view that 
the protection offered by a staggered board reduces the firm’s exposure to hostile market threats, 
thereby benefitting managers. According to Cremers and Nair (2005), who proposed a three-factor 
entrenchment index (one of the factors being the presence of a staggered board), entrenched 
managers are able to insulate themselves from the hostile takeover market, which in turn causes 
reduced firm valuation. Similarly, Faleye (2007) shows that CEOs of firms with staggered boards 
face lower forced turnover probability, are less likely to leave involuntarily due to poor 
performance,  and receive compensation that are less sensitive to firm financial performance. 
However, several studies give an alternative perspective and show a positive effect of 
staggered boards on firm performance. Ahn and Shrestha (2013) find that the effects of staggered 
boards on firm valuation vary depending on the characteristics of the firm. They show that 
staggered boards benefit firms with higher advising needs and lower monitoring costs. Chemmanur 
and Jiao (2012) document that staggered boards reduce the propensity of managers to undertake 
projects that are not in the best interests of shareholders. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis 
of takeover defenses, several authors note that staggered boards increase firm value by 
strengthening the firm’s commitment to a business investment strategy (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988; Johnson et al., 2015). They show that staggered boards are positively associated with Tobin’s 
q for firms which have important business relationships. 
Rose (2009) also offers an alternative perspective. She finds that the effect of staggered 
boards on firm value varies depending on the takeover probability firms face. Using outside 
ownership concentration as a proxy for takeover probability, she provides empirical evidence to 
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show that the negative effect of staggered boards on Tobin’s q disappears for a subset of firms that 
operate in a non-existent hostile takeover market. 
In this paper, our objective is to analyze how the takeover-resistant character of staggered 
boards affects firms in the REIT sector. We argue that the previously observed negative 
relationship between staggered boards and firm valuation relies on an intensive market for 
corporate control and thus may not apply when the hostile market is absent. In addition to the 
evidence presented by Rose (2009) on this matter, Campbell et al. (2011) argue that the negative 
effect of ATPs on firm value is dependent on the intensity of the takeover market. In other words, 
the entrenched management hypothesis may not be retained for firms operating in an inactive 
market for corporate control. There is additional evidence that the inefficient management 
hypothesis may not hold for REITs. For example, the fact that abnormal returns following the 
announcement of an acquisition are lower (although still positive) for real-estate targets than for 
targets in other sectors has been well documented (McIntosh et al., 1989; Campbell et al., 1998 and 
2011).  Friday and Sirmans (1998) account for this finding by pointing to the institutional 
restrictions of the real-estate sector, which result in inefficient external corporate governance.  
Although no previous studies have examined the effect of staggered boards on firm value for 
REITs, there are several studies that have examined the relationship between the corporate 
governance of REITs and their performance. It is generally accepted (e.g. see Feng et al., 2005) 
that good corporate governance is associated with higher financial performance. However, Bianco 
et al. (2007) find that there is a positive relationship between good corporate governance and firm 
value during the year 2004, whereas the effect is diminished in 2006, reflecting the ineffectiveness 
of takeover index when comparing performance across firms in REITs. The recent results make it 
interest to explore how anti-takeover devices affect firm value. Therefore, we aim to analyze 
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whether the inefficient management hypothesis holds for the real-estate sector by focusing on (a) 
the performance of target REITs following disciplinary and non-disciplinary takeovers and (b) the 
effect of staggered boards on long-term shareholder wealth. 
To summarize, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the 
relationship between staggered boards and firm valuation in REITs. Campbell et al. (2011) find 
that the presence of staggered boards is not associated with negative abnormal returns in REITs, 
which is contrary to the previous view of the adverse effects of staggered boards. They attribute 
this finding to abundant takeover threats in REITs, such that managers are immune from market 
discipline. Following Rose (2009) and Campbell et al. (2011), if the negative effect of staggered 
boards on firm value relies on an active takeover market, this effect should not be observed for 
REITs. As we discussed previously, the character of staggered boards have two side effects on firm 
value; that is, first, the presence of staggered boards may entrench managers, thereby negatively 
affecting the firm value; second, a staggered board election structure benefits firm by providing 
board continuity, stability and independence, thereby implementing closer monitoring and 
positively affecting firm value. The negative effect of staggered boards dominate in other sectors, 
whereas the negative effect of staggered boards may be neutralized due to the lack of a takeover 
market in REITs. Thus, we argue that staggered boards may help to monitor long-term investments 
and may provide benefits to directors who are not aligned with management. In an REIT 
environment, the presence of a staggered board can be regarded as increasing internal monitoring, 




Based on the extant literature, we develop the following three hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Absence of takeover mechanism in REITs makes the disciplinary mechanism 
on poorly managed firms ineffective. If there is indeed no significant difference in abnormal returns 
between the disciplinary group including all targets with a change of CEO and the respective 
control group including all targets without a change of CEO before takeovers and around takeovers, 
we can conclude that the market for corporate control is inactive in REITs.  
Hypothesis 2: If there is a positive relationship between the presence of staggered boards 
and firm value in REITs, we can conclude that the observed negative effect of staggered boards 
can be offset and replaced by a potential positive effect offered by a staggered board for firms that 
operate in an inactive market.  
Hypothesis 3: If there is a negative effect of staggered boards on takeover probability, we 
can conclude that REITs with staggered boards are less likely to become takeover targets because 
board classification makes it hard to remove the whole board at one time and gains control of a 
company through takeovers. 
Data 
Sample construction 
My data is concentrated on the REITs which have the four-digit SIC code 6798. The data 
sample period is over the period from 1990 to 2016. First, we sort Compustat by four-digit SIC 
code 6798. This sample covers 586 unique firms and 6321 firm-year observations. The main 
dependent variable in this paper is firm value which is measured by Tobin’s q following several 
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earlier studies which explore the relationship between staggered boards and firm value (Gompers 
et al., 2003; Faleye, 2007; Cremers et al., 2017). I only retain firms that are available for data from 
Compustat and CRSP. I measure Tobin’s q using the data related to the market value of common 
stock, the book value of common stock, the book value of total assets, and deferred taxes. Second, 
I merge my sample with CRSP database. If the data for the market value of equity is missing from 
Compustat, I replace it as the number of shares outstanding times the stock price at the end of the 
year, following Konijn et al. (2011). The data sample reduces to 373 unique firms and 4327 firm-
year observations after constructing the dependent variable. Then, I hand collected the key 
explanatory variable of interest, staggered boards from EDGAR database. There are 13 firms 
removed from the data sample list because of non-existence on SEC, the lack of company fillings 
DEF 14A, or lack of information on staggered boards. The data sample reduces to 360 unique firms 
and 4259 firm-year observations. Then, I collect internal corporate governance information as 
control variables. For this paper, we focus on the board size, board composition, and unitary 
leadership from BoardEx available on Wharton Research Data Services. In order to keep 
consistency of the data sample size through the analysis, I only keep firm-year observations with 
non-missing value of required firm-specific variables and board information. Moreover, I obtain 
mergers and acquisition transactions from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database.  
Our final sample consists of 3755 firm-year observations by 315 unique firms and is 






Several authors use Tobin’s q as a measurement of firm value when they investigate the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and firm value in REITs (Morck et al., 
1988; Gompers et al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2010). Consistent with the earlier studies, I use the ratio 
of the market value of the assets to book value of the assets. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), 
we define the market value of assets as the sum of the book value of the assets plus the market 
value of equity minus the book value of equity and deferred taxes from Compustat.  As an 
additional measurement of market value of equity for the missing value, we calculate it by 
multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the price per share at the end of the year from 
CRSP data.  
Control variables 
In order to mitigate potential biases due to omitted variables and isolate the effects of 
staggered boards on firm value, we control for other variables that have influence on firm value 
documented by literature. We provide variable definitions of all control variables in the Appendix 
A. First, I control for the differences of firm financials. We define firm size as the natural logarithm 
of total assets. The growth opportunities are less for larger and mature firms. Konijin et al. (2011) 
find that there is a negative relationship between firm size and firm value. The bigger the firm is, 
the less operating efficiency a firm has (Faleye, 2007; Konijin et al., 2011). Leverage can be 
positively or negatively associated with firm value. On the one hand, Jensen (1986) argues that 
leverage can bring advantages to firm through its discipline role by debt, therefore increasing 
external monitoring effectiveness. On the other hand, leverage may affect firms through the 
riskiness of debt or debt constraint on investment (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). Stock liquidity 
is calculated by the turnover rate. Maug (1998) and Koniji et al. (2011) show that there is a positive 
association between share liquidity and firm value. Profitability is commonly used as a proxy for 
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growth opportunities. Since Tobin’s q is not only a measurement for firm value, but also a good 
indicator for growth opportunities, it is necessary to control for profitability, and leverage 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Yermack, 1996; Ahn et al., 2012). Following Ahn et al. (2012), 
we define profitability as operating margin. We also control for dividend yield following Eichholtz 
and Kok (2008). Low dividend payout ratio might indicate that the firm has less cash available for 
distribution or firm retain cash for other financial activities instead of distributing to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). That is, firms are in poor financial position and find it difficult to payout dividends 
or managers of firms with large number of free cash flow are more likely to get involved in 
activities that are value-destroying, thus we expect that there is a positive relationship between 
dividend yield and firm value. We also have a set of governance control variables that are identified 
to greatly affect firm value from the perspective of internal governance monitoring mechanisms 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Shivdasani, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1998). Thus, we control for board size, CEO duality and board composition. In line with the view 
that REITs operate in a weak market for corporate control,  we have argued thus far that the internal 
governance mechanism is more important for REITs than for firms in other sectors. Three 
characteristics of board structure have been shown to alleviate the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders: smaller board size, the presence of independent directors, and CEO 
duality. The positive effect of a smaller board size on coordination and cohesiveness was first 
documented by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993). Yermack (1996) provides consistent 
evidence that board size is negatively associated with Tobin’s q. Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Mak 
and Kusnadi (2004) report a negative relationship between board size and firm value for small 
firms and firms in Singapore and Malaysia, respectively. However, recent studies show the 
apparently contradictory result that large board size can be associated with higher firm value as the 
proportion of independent directors who sit on the board is the key factor that affects firm value. 
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Finkelstein et al. (2009) argue that outsider directors with diverse backgrounds are in a better 
position to provide sound advice to management. This leads into the second characteristic that has 
been shown to reduce agency problems, namely, the presence of independent directors. Boards 
with a higher proportion of independent directors implement more effective monitoring (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Friday and Sirmans, 1998). Independent directors are those who have no business 
relationship with the firm except for their directorship. Therefore, independent directors are more 
likely to monitor managerial decision-making under the assumption that it needs to be in the 
interests of shareholders’ wealth. Thirdly, CEO duality reduces the power of board independence 
on disciplining and monitoring the CEO (Core et al., 1999). Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) find a 
negative relationship between CEO duality and board independence in the real-estate sector.  
Methodology 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squared Regression (Pooled OLS regression) 
The relationship between staggered boards and firm value is analyzed using the following 
base model: ܨ�ݎ݉ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁�� = ߙ + ߚଵሺܵݐܽ݃݃݁ݎ݁݀ ܾ݋ܽݎ݀ሻ�� + ߚଶܨ�ݎ݉ ܵ�ݖ݁�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଷ�݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁�ሺ�−ଵሻ  
                  + ߚସܵℎܽݎ݁ ��ݍݑ�݀�ݐݕ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚହ�ݎ݋݂�ݐܾܽ�݈�ݐݕ�ሺ�−ଵሻ  
                  +ߚ଺ܦ�ݒ�݀݁݊݀ �ܽݕ݋ݑݐ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚ଻ܤ݋ܽݎ݀ ܵ�ݖ݁��                                     +ߚ଼ܤ݋ܽݎ݀ ܥ݋݉݌݋ݏ�ݐ�݋݊�� + ߚଽܷ݊�ݐܽݎݕ �݁ܽ݀݁ݎݏℎ�݌�� + ���                          ሺͳሻ                              
We specifically develop different models based on the base model in order to serve the 
purpose of the study. The dependent variable is firm value which is measured by Tobin’s q and 
independent variable is staggered board. We expand the vector of control variables in the base 
model. All firm financial control variables are calculated one year prior and label as t-1. Staggered 
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boards are based on the fiscal year t because the firm is unable to quickly adopt or remove a 
staggered board in order to resist being acquired of a forthcoming takeover (Sokolyk, 2011). First, 
we start our study by a pooled ordinary least squared regression (pooled OLS). Second, following 
Cremers et al. (2017), we differentiate the effect of staggered boards on firm value between cross-
sectional association and long-term time series association. Hence, we use different fixed effects 
estimators in our model. 
In model (2), we regress the same pooled OLS with a year fixed effect to remove variations 
over the time period, providing the cross-sectional association of staggered boards and Tobin’s q. ܨ�ݎ݉ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁�� = ߙ + ߚଵሺܵݐܽ݃݃݁ݎ݁݀ ܾ݋ܽݎ݀ሻ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଶܺ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଷ �ܸ�                                                    +ߚ௡ܻ݁ܽݎ ܦݑ݉݉�݁ݏ + ���                                                                      ሺʹሻ 
Where ܺ�ሺ�−ଵሻ is a vector of control variables related to firm financials, and  
�ܸ� is a vector of board related variables.  
In model (3) and (4), we add a firm fixed effect estimator to control for the possible time-
invariant characteristics of each firm, thereby reducing the potential bias and providing evidence 
about the time series association of how staggered boards affect firm value.  ܨ�ݎ݉ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁�� = ߙ + ߚଵሺܵݐܽ݃݃݁ݎ݁݀ ܾ݋ܽݎ݀ሻ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଶܺ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଷ �ܸ�                                                  +ߚ௡ܨ�ݎ݉ ܦݑ݉݉�݁ݏ + ���                                                                         ሺ͵ሻ ܨ�ݎ݉ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁�� = ߙ + ߚଵሺܵݐܽ݃݃݁ݎ݁݀ ܾ݋ܽݎ݀ሻ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଶܺ�ሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଷ �ܸ� 
                                  +ߚ௡ܨ�ݎ݉ ܦݑ݉݉�݁ݏ + ߚ௠ܻ݁ܽݎ ܦݑ݉݉�݁ݏ + ���                                ሺͶሻ 
Where ܺ�ሺ�−ଵሻ is a vector of control variables related to firm financials, and 




In this section, we test the effectiveness of external governance in REITs. Our hypothesis 
tested is based on the view that takeovers discipline inefficiently performing firms and reallocate 
resources. We then test whether the targets subject to disciplinary takeovers in REITs show lower 
abnormal returns in the period before the takeover and receive higher takeover premium around 
bid announcements. Following Kennedy and Limmack (1996), I divided the sample of takeovers 
into two groups, with group A including all targets in which CEO is not retain for the two years 
after bid announcements. Group B includes all targets in which CEO is retain for the same period. 
Of the 75 takeovers, 37 were included in group A and the others were included in group B. We 
define group A as disciplinary group and group B as non-disciplinary group. We compare 
differences in abnormal returns between group A and group B in the period before the takeover 
around takeovers. Following McIntosh et al. (1989) and Olgun (2005), we adopt the standard 
market model to measure the abnormal returns before and after bid announcements during the 
following 6 sub-periods: days (-14, -8), days (-7, -1), days (-1, +1), event day (0), days (0, +1), and 
days (-7, +7). We perform an event study using Eventus provided by Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). The models are based on the CRSP value-weighted market index. The 
estimation window used in this paper is (-255, -46). This study use cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for measuring abnormal returns. Equation (5) is the market model which uses prior daily 
returns to estimate the parameters.                 ܧሺܴሻ�,� = ߙ� + ߚ�ܴ௠� + ��,�, ݐ = ͳ,ʹ, … . . ܶ                                                                  ሺͷሻ                    
Where ܴ�� is the return on firm i for period t and ܴ௠� is the market return for period t. 
The estimation window used in this paper is (-255, -46) and the event day is day 0.  
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Equation (6) is used to estimate the abnormal return ܣܴ�,�.                                       ܣܴ�,� = ܴ�,� − ܧሺܴሻ�,�                                                                                  ሺ͸)    
Equation (7) is used to measure the cumulative effects from event day p to event day q for each 
takeover i.                                            Cܣܴ�,௣,௤ = ∑ ܣܴ�,�௤�=௣                                                                              ሺ͹ሻ    
The statistical significance of differences across sub-groups are tested based on p-value, 
assuming unequal variances.  
Logistic Regression Model 
We estimate a logistic model to test whether staggered boards actually deter takeover bids. 
The dependent variable is a binary variable and is coded as 1 if a firm were acquired during our 
data period from 1990 to 2016, and 0 otherwise. We pool all firm year observations and thus have 
3755 firm year in total, of which 75 are coded as 1 and 3680 are coded as zero. We control prior 
firm financial performance in our model because recent studies argue that poor firm performance 
increases the probability that a firm become a target in a takeover bid (Graham et al., 2002). This 
finding holds for real estate sector as well (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008). We define prior firm 
performance as total assets in previous years. We control for certain firm characteristics and 
governance variables based on the existing studied in order to isolate the effects of staggered boards 
on the probability to receive a bid in takeover activity. We include firm size, probability, leverage, 
share liquidity, and dividend yield. All accounting control variables are calculated one year prior 
to the year in which targets were acquired. We also employ a set of control variables related to 
governance mechanism, including board size, CEO duality and board composition. We expect that 
large non-executive dominated board combined with non CEO-duality suggest higher corporate 
18 
 
governance mechanism which reduce the probability of becoming a takeover target. The estimated 
logistic model has the following functional form:            ܤ�ܦ�� = ߙ�� + ߚଵሺܵݐ݃݃݁ݎ݁݀ ܾ݋ܽݎ݀ሻ�� + ߚଶ �ܺሺ�−ଵሻ + ߚଷ �ܸ� + ���                                         ሺͺሻ  
where:  ܤ�ܦ�� is a dummy variable and equal to one if firm i was a target in a takeover event in year t, zero 
otherwise. ߙ�� is a constant ܺ�ሺ�−ଵሻ is a vector of control variables related to firm financials,  
�ܸ� is a vector of board related variables. 
Results  
Summary statistics 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The summary statistics for a selection of financial and accounting variables are presented in 
Table 1 during data period from 1990 to 2016. We only include the firms in the sample that have 
financial data available in Compustat and CRSP, which results in 3755 firm-year observations in 
total. The average Tobin’s q in our sample is 1.2603 which is slightly lower than the average of 
Tobin’s q during the period from 2004 to 2006 reported in Bianco et al. (2007). Thirty seven percent 
of the REITs firms have staggered boards in our sample while about 60 % of the U.S. firms have 
staggered boards for other sectors presented by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Ahn et al. (2012). 
This evidence may reveal that the anti-takeover devices are less likely to be taken by entrenched 
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managers in order to resist takeover bids. The total assets of REITs ranges from $9.20 million to 
$24.86 billion, with an average of a little less than $2.76 billion compared to other sectors. Firm 
size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. The average firm size of REITs is 6.88 
which is similar to other sectors. The average leverage ratio is 49.9%. Feng et al. (2005) and Ling 
and Petrova (2011) find a similar observation and report that the leverage ratio of REITs is 51% 
on average. In other sectors, Ahn et al. (2012) report the mean average leverage ratio is 29% which 
is definitely lower than that of REITs. This evidence intuitively gets better insight in the view that 
the REITs face more capital market monitoring of management investment decisions. The mean 
and median share liquidity are 1.1224 and 0.8009 respectively. The mean and median profitability 
for our sample are 0.052 and 0.054, respectively, which is lower than the mean of 0.122 and median 
of 0.134 reported by Faleye (2007) concentrated on firm sample in other sectors. The mean 
dividend yield is 6.84 which is consistent with literatures on REITs during recent years (Bianco et 
al., 2007; Ling and Petrova, 2011). REIT boards consist of an average of eight members, with the 
smallest board having four members, and the largest consisting of 17 members. The average for 
unitary leadership is 0.44 which implies the proportion of REITs where the CEO also serves as the 
chairman of the board of directors. The statistics are considerably lower than that for other sectors 
(0.68) reported. The number for board composition for our sample shows that REITs have 
maximum of 92 % of the board directors that are not affiliated with firms or top executives of the 
firm and have minimal or no business dealings with the company, with the average value is 68.3%. 
These statistics are higher than reported by Friday and Sirmans (1998) for REITs during the periods 
from 1980 to 1994. These board related statistics show a favorable enhanced internal monitoring 
effects concentrated on the board independence for REITs. Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) contribute 
the increasing proportion of independent directors to the institutional ownership of REITs shares.  
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< Insert Table 2 here > 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between financial accounting variables, 
board relation control variables and firm performance variable. The statistics reveal significant 
relationships. There is negative relationship between staggered boards and Tobin’s q however the 
correlation coefficient is insignificant. In line with our expectations, there are positive relation 
between profitability and Tobin’s q. Leverage and unitary leadership are negatively associated with 
Tobin’s q, respectively. Consistent with the view presented by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), 
board size can be positively related to Tobin’s q conditional on the high proportion of independent 
directors on boards for REITs. Consistent with previous literatures (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003), 
larger firms generate revenue and operating profitability with the different economies of scale in 
REIT industry. There is a significantly negative relationship between dividend yield and firm value 
which is consistent with the view presented by Wang et al. (1993). They argue that for REITs, 
higher dividend ratio is one of the most important tool for shareholders to monitoring management 
for poor-governed firms in terms of free cash flow retained for future investment. 
Target firms abnormal returns 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
Target abnormal returns were calculated by the market model defined earlier in methodology 
part. Table 3 reports the abnormal returns for all targets. Panel A presents the abnormal returns 
during pre-bid periods and panel B presents the excess returns around bids. There is little evidence 
that the targets presented negative abnormal returns prior to bid. That is, the inefficient 
management hypothesis may not hold for REITs because of the lack of evidence of poor 
performance of targets before takeovers. There are positive returns prior the bid (-7, -1), which 
may be due to the information leakage before bid announcements in line with the view argued by 
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Higson and Elliott (1993). Column 2 and column 3 show abnormal returns for two subgroups which 
are classified by the CEO tenure in 2 years after the bids. If CEOs is not retain for 2 years after 
bids, the bid is classified in the disciplinary group, also named as group a, otherwise group b. The 
last column presents the results of the test of difference between mean CARs for two subgroups. 
The difference of abnormal returns between disciplinary and non-disciplinary groups is -0.06 prior 
to the bid (-14, -8) but the difference is not significant. Targets in disciplinary group continue to 
underperform their counterparts around bids although the differences of mean CARs between two 
subgroups are not significant. These statistics may be interpreted from the perspective of the 
function of disciplining managers. The market for corporate control in the REITs is failed to 
discipline managers via takeovers. However, table 3 presents results from the (-1, +1) window and 
(-7, +7) window indicate that targets exhibit positive abnormal returns of 8.44 (p-value <.0001) 
and 9.25 (p-value <.0001) respectively. These results are consistent with the inefficient 
management hypothesis, which provides some interesting results that are not fully in line with our 
expectations. We argue that the results may be explained by the view that poor performance is the 
drive of takeovers, therefore the market for corporate control discipline poor-managed firms. In 
order to confirm our view, we then test whether the prior performance of REITs is negatively 
associated with takeover likelihood and whether takeover devices function well in the special 
environment for REITs. 
Takeover likelihood and staggered boards 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
Table 4 presents results of the effects of staggered boards on firm’s takeover probability. We 
use the logistic model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
firm becomes a target in a takeover event. Control variables include financial accounting variables 
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and board control variables. However, the staggered boards have insignificantly negative effects 
on takeover likelihood. We measure previous firm performance using Tobin’s q in prior years. 
There is significantly negative relationship between prior firm performance and takeover 
probability. That is, the poor performance is one of the most important motivation for bidders to 
acquire firms. Consistent with the evidence provided by Eichholtz and Kok (2008), the takeovers 
act to discipline targets with poor performance, in line with the inefficient management hypothesis.  
Univariate test  
In order to analyze the effects of staggered boards on firm value, we run a univariate test 
first. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for firm financials variables and board characteristics 
variables with difference mean and difference median in the final two columns.  
<Insert Table 5 here>  
Firms with staggered boards have lower Tobin’s q than those without staggered boards 
although the difference is not statistically significant. Firms with staggered boards are on average 
smaller than those without staggered boards. Firms with staggered boards are also levered more. 
Profitability and dividend yield are slightly higher for firms with staggered boards than those 
without staggered boards. This result reveals that firms with staggered boards tend to have higher 
growth opportunities. Firms with staggered boards are less liquid than firms without staggered 
boards. In addition to accounting variables, we also examine several governance variables. Firms 
with staggered boards have smaller board size, less independent directors than those without 
staggered boards. In addition, for firms with staggered boards, CEO is less likely to serve as the 
chair of the board, but the difference mean is not statistically significant.   
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Overall, the univariate test provides the evidence that firms with staggered boards have 
favorably different traits compared to firms without staggered boards. Thus, it is necessary and 
important to control for firm financials and corporate governance characteristics to isolate the 
effects of staggered boards on firm value. 
Multivariate test between staggered boards and firm value 
Table 5 presents the test result examining the relationship between staggered boards and 
Tobin’s q by using the ordinary least squared regression (OLS regression) specification, following 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007). Column (5) control for year fixed effects and 
column (6) control for year and firm fixed effects. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
Model (1) is the base model in which Tobin’s q is regressed on the staggered boards and 
other control variables including firm size, leverage, share liquidity, profitability and dividend 
yield. The results provides the evidence that the staggered boards have negative effects on firm 
value for REITs, which is similar with the evidence presented for other sectors in prior literatures. 
The coefficient of staggered boards is -0.023 and statistically significant at the 10 % level. The 
positive relationship between firm size and firm value is contrast with our expectation. The 
coefficient of dividend yield is in a negative sign, which is reverse to our expectation. This result 
can be explained by the special regulation environment of REITs. Wang et al. (1993) argue that 
mandatory payout policy make REITs highly regulated firms. Shareholders monitor management 
investment decisions by requiring greater dividend only from poorly performing REITs, therefore, 
higher dividend yield is correlated with severe agency problems in REITs. That is, there is negative 
relation between dividend yield and firm performance.  
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We next include corporate governance variables, board size, CEO duality (Unitary 
leadership) and board composition. In model (2) and (3), we introduce board size and unitary 
leadership respectively. The board size is positively related with firm value. However, the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient of staggered boards on firm value remain 
same as the model (1). In mode (4), we introduce board composition to the model. The negative 
effects of staggered boards disappear combined with positive relationship between board 
composition and firm value. Higher board composition is a good indicator of independent board 
related to good corporate governance as well. This result implies that when the board is 
independent, the adverse effects of staggered boards disappear.     
Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, we examine whether the market for corporate control disciplines inefficient 
management by comparing the abnormal returns to targets between disciplinary group and non-
disciplinary group by event study. The results show that in the period before takeovers, the 
abnormal returns of disciplinary group are not significantly lower than those of non-disciplinary 
group. In addition, abnormal returns of disciplinary group fail to dominate those of non-disciplinary 
group around takeovers. Then, we analyze the relationship between the presence staggered boards 
and takeover probability, we fail to find negative relationship between staggered boards and 
takeover likelihood, however prior firm performance is negatively related to takeover probability. 
These results imply although the market for corporate control does not directly discipline 
managements, it is not virtually non-existent as previously noted because the poor performing firms 
face higher likelihood of becoming targets, thereby providing empirical evidence for the inefficient 
management hypothesis. Furthermore, we explore the relationship between the presence of 
staggered boards and firm by estimate an OLS regression. As we discussed earlier, there are two 
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side effects of staggered boards and firm value. The evidence that the potential benefit of board 
classification is masked by its negative effect is emphasized by pointing to the entrenched 
management hypothesis in other sectors. In this paper, we investigate whether the positive effect 
of staggered boards dominate due to the REIT environment with special regulations. In REITs, we 
find that the negative effect of staggered boards on firm performance remained despite of the less 
active takeover market. In addition, we show that the negative effect of staggered boards disappear 
when we include board composition into our model. We define the proportion of independent 
directors who sit on boards as board composition. That is, poorly managed firms tend to adopt 
staggered boards, thereby exacerbating agency conflicts and altering firms’ exposure to market 
discipline. In contrast, firms with good corporate governance may bring value to shareholders’ 
wealth by adopting staggered boards to provide board independence, stability, and closer 
monitoring on managers when they plan for future investments. To sum up, the market discipline 
is effective when the firm underperform the others in REITs although there is little hostile takeover. 
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This table presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent variables. The 
sample consists of 315 unique firms and 3755 firm-year observations after merging all available REITs 
information from Compustat, CRSP, the SDC and BoardEx from 1990 to 2016. Staggered board 
information is collected from the SEC’s EDGAR database by identifier CIK or company name. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 





Tobin's q 3755 1.2603 1.1819 0.4045 0.3061 5.6885 
Staggered board 3755 0.3686 0.0000 0.4825 0.0000 1.0000 
Total assets ($ million) 3755 2763.42 1178.86 4277.22 9.199 24857.43 
Leverage 3755 0.4993 0.5033 0.2149 0.0000 0.9533 
Share liquidity 3755 1.1224 0.8009 1.1102 0.0374 6.5332 
Profitability 3755 0.0522 0.0540 0.0341 -0.0759 0.1436 
Dividend yield 3755 0.0684 0.0620 0.0512 0.0000 0.3085 
Board size 3755 8.1997 8.0000 2.0663 4.0000 17.0000 
Unitary leadership 3755 0.4410 0.0000 0.4966 0.0000 1.0000 
Board composition 3755 0.6834 0.6666 0.1308 0.2000 0.9231 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents Pearson’s correlations among variables. Statistical significance is based on the p-values and is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
















































































































































































































Table 3: Targets’ abnormal return for disciplinary and control group 
Target mean abnormal returns for the disciplinary group and the control group. Target abnormal 
returns are based on a market model Event study in Eventus. We present p-values in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 







CAR (%) CAR DIFF (%) 








Panel A: Pre-bid period 
(-14, -8) -0.17 -0.20 -0.14 -0.06 
 (0.7008) (0.7941) (0.7612) (0.9460) 
(   -7,-1) 1.34*** 1.33 1.35*** -0.02 
 (0.0062) (0.1205) (0.0064) (0.9851) 
 
Panel B: Bid period  
(-7,+7) 9.25*** 8.32*** 10.17***  -1.85 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4227) 
(0,+1) 8.07*** 7.47*** 8.67*** -1.20 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5576) 
0 6.41*** 5.31*** 7.54*** -2.23 
 (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.2599) 
(-1,+1) 8.44*** 8.09*** 8.80*** -0.71 





Table 4: Logistic regression model of the effect of staggered boards on takeover likelihood 
Logistic regression estimates of the effect of staggered boards on takeover 
likelihood. The dependent variable equals one if the firm received a bid during the 
period from 1990 to 2016, and zero otherwise. We control for prior firm 
performance using Tobin’ q. All models control for year fixed effects. We present 
p-values in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 








Intercept -3.111*** -3.446*** 
 (<.0001) (0.0001) 
Staggered board[t] -0.101 -0.107 
 (0.3991) (0.3754) 
Tobin's q [t-1] -0.744* -0.777* 
 (0.0695) (0.0629) 
Firm size[t-1] 0.0511 0.032 
 (0.5609) (0.7301) 
Leverage[t-1] 0.3457 0.381 
 (0.5519) (0.5159) 
Share liquidity[t-1] -0.4587** -0.454** 
 (0.0216) (0.0247) 
Profitability[t-1] 0.903 0.863 
 (0.8104) (0.8200) 
Dividend yield[t-1] 3.450 3.320 
 (0.1228) (0.1328) 
Board size[t]  0.039 
  (0.4991) 
Unitary leadership[t]  -0.066 
  (0.7852) 
Board composition[t]  0.292 
  (0.7613) 
# of firm-year observations 3755 3755 
Prob. > ChiSq 0.0687 0.1309 
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.03 
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Table 5: Univariate tests to compare the characteristics of REITs with and without staggered boards 
This table reports the mean and median characteristics of REITs with staggered boards and those without staggered boards. The sample consists 
of 3755 firm-year observations, of which 1384 observations are in the group with staggered boards and 2371 observations are in the annual board 
structure group. The last two columns report differences in means and medians, with p-values for a t-test and a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for 
the two subgroups, *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in the last 
two column in brackets. 
 Staggered board structure (1) 
 
Annual board structure (0) 















































































































































Table 6: Multivariate regression of the effect of staggered boards on firm performance 
This table contains results for a series of OLS regressions of the effects of staggered boards on Tobin’s 
q. The dependent variable in each regression is Tobin’s q, which is calculated by the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of total assets. Staggered board equals one if directors are elected for 
staggered terms, and zero otherwise. Columns (1)-(4) are pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regressions. Column (5) includes year dummies and column (6) includes year and firm fixed effects. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. We present p-values in parentheses. ***, **, 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on a two-tailed test. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Staggered board[t] -0.023* -0.022* -0.022* -0.012 -0.002 -0.173 
 (0.0614) (0.0824) (0.0861) (0.3315) (0.8474) (0.2953) 
Firm size[t-1] 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.011** -0.049*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0149) (<.0001) 
Leverage[t-1] -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.083*** -0.074** -0.077** 
 (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0055) (0.0108) (0.0219) 
Share liquidity[t-1] 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.015** -0.006 0.013** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0203) (0.4309) (0.0364) 
Profitability[t-1] 4.137*** 4.106*** 4.106*** 4.116*** 4.784*** 2.879*** 
 (<.0001) (.<0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Dividend yield[t-1] -2.315*** -2.309*** -2.310*** -2.151*** -1.960*** -0.929*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Board size[t]  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.002 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6075) 
Unitary leadership[t]   0.007 0.009 0.010 0.023 
   (0.5946) (0.4417) (0.3646) (0.1167) 
Board composition[t]    0.525*** 0.322*** 0.135** 
    (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0387) 
# of unique firms 315 315 315 315 315 315 
# of firm-year 
observations 3755 3755 3755 3755 3755 3755 
Adj. R square 0.190 0.193 0.193 0.217 0.291 0.610 
F-stat 147.91*** 128.94*** 112.83*** 116.80*** 44.94*** 15.37*** 
Year Fixed Effects: NO NO NO NO YES YES 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
This table defines our main dependent and independent variables and provides the data sources 
used to construct them. All accounting variables are constructed from Compustat and board 
related variables are constructed from BoardEx. In each case, they refer to the most recent 
fiscal year end. Variables constructed from CRSP are calculated at the end of the year. 










Market value/book value: (bv (total assets) + mv (equity) 






Staggered board dummy, equal to 1 when the firm has a 
classified board structure, and 0 when the firm has an 
annual board structure. 
EDGAR 
Ln(size) The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat 
Leverage 
 





Turnover: annual average of daily trading volume/the 
number of shares outstanding. 
CRSP 
Profitability Earnings before interest (EBIT)/Total assets. Compustat 
Dividend yield Dividends per share/Closing share price. Compustat 
Board size Total number of directors on the board. BoardEx 
Unitary leadership 
 
Unitary leadership dummy, equal to 1 when the CEO 




Ratio of independent directors to total board size. BoardEx 
 
 
